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The question of whether or not the United States has an operative, deliberate national ocean policy is generating increasing concern among statesmen, scholars, and others concerned with our future role in the uses of ocean space. In short, does this nation conduct its ocean affairs with the same planning and deliberation as

its foreign affairs? While many believe this nation has a perfectly adequate national ocean policy, it is the basic proposition of
this Article that, in fact, this is not the case and what passes for
national ocean policy is actually a rather uncoordinated grouping
of special interests competing for finite resources and policy support, often at the expense of each other. It is a further proposition
of this Article that in order for the United States to proceed in
a logical and open-ended manner toward full uses of ocean space,
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it will be necessary for some continuing framework of national
ocean policy to be established at the highest levels of Government,
in both the executive and legislative branches.
The operative term "national ocean policy" should be defined for
the purposes of this essay as that activity which defines and governs
the sum total of all national uses of the sea, and which determines
how the United States will use the world ocean as an instrument of
its own national policy. "Uses of the sea" means all uses of -theocean
space which are designed to either provide economic or national
security advantage to the United States. Also, the term "sea power"
is used in this essay interchangeably with "uses of the sea." These
uses include living and nonliving resources, marine transport, employment of naval forces, regulation and governance over territorial
waters and economic zones, research, safety at sea, and marine recreation. The "catalog" is much more extensive; however, these examples illustrate the general Categories that would fall under the
rubric of "uses of the sea."
This critical issue of ocean policy is often overlooked by most students, scholars, and practitioners in marine studies who confuse the
component parts of ocean policy represented by such areas as law
of the sea, oceanography, naval affairs, etc., with the much broader
framework which is the true national ocean policy. In other words,
national ocean policy is presently more in the mind of the beholder
than it is institutionalized. In addition, appearance may be confused with substance. Many agencies within the Government are
adept at establishing initiatives for programs which at best can be
characterized as "fair words and few deeds." The basic point is
that national ocean policy is the requisite substrate upon which all
of the interrelated national maritime activities must be constructed.
This substrate does not presently exist, and thus the component
parts cannot be exercised in effective, harmonious relationship with
each other. The result is that United States ocean activities are
considerably less effective than should be expected from the present
allocation of resources to these activities. Furthermore, the lack
of a master plan makes it extremely difficult to do coherent planning for future resource allocation to maximize United States ocean
interests and to minimize scientific, technical and political surprises.
Thus, it is imperative that persons involved in the component parts
of the national ocean effort, whether it is science, technology or

law, must be concerned with how their activities should relate to
the whole, even though the "whole" does not exist except in a weak,
de facto sense. This essay is dedicated to providing the necessary
overview on how national ocean policy should be defined, developed
and managed.
In the first paragraph of this Article, the reference to "special
initerests" is meant to indicate those parts or elements of the national ocean program which are principally under coherent management within the federal government. Perhaps the best perspective
-onthe present situation within the federal government can be given
by quoting the introduction to a recent report by the General Accounting Office:
The United States has no comprehensive national ocean program.
Federal marine science and other oceanic activities are conducted
by 21 organizations in six departments and five agencies. Necessarily, many of the activities of these organizations are closely related .... [I]t is doubtful that the resources of the 11 departments
and agencies are being applied to best serve national purposes.1
Table 12 provides a listing of these organizations whose missions
(real or perceived) cause them to have some level of marine programs. It should be noted, however, that the first four organizations listed in Table 1 account for nearly 87 percent of the federal
spending in this area.
Each of these ocean interest groups, either in concert with other
specialized interests or alone, eventually attempts to influence their
power structure at the highest possible levels of the executive (i.e.,
the Office of Management and Budget) and the legislative branches

of government through a variety of strategies and tactics. While
each of these agencies believes they are managing their resources
in the best possible way for the national interest, the fact remains
that the national interest with respect to ocean space has not been
articulated to provide a comprehensive and coherent plan of guidance. Thus, a recent workshop on ocean policy sponsored by the
National Science Foundation noted:
The fragmentation of marine policy-making in the United States
has placed grave difficulties on defining a set of national priorities
that serve not only for national policy-making but also provide a
unified negotiating position for any international negotiations-including, but not limited to, the Law of the Sea negotiations.3
1. U.S. GENERAL AccoUNTmNG OFFIcE, THE NEED FOR NATIONAL OCEAN
PROGRAM AND PLAN (GGD-75-97, Oct. 1975). It should be noted that the
count is actually 27 different activities, ranging from cabinet level departments to individual offices within larger departments and agencies.
2. Id. at 34 (modified by author).
3. R. FRIEDHEIm
& J. KmILDOW, REPORT OF THE OCEAN PoLicY WORKsHoP
(Public Research Institute, Center for Naval Analyses, PRI 196-75, 1975).
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Table 1
FederalGovernment Organizationswith
Marine Science and OceanicAffairs Activities
(Figures in parentheses indicate each organization's percentage
of total U. S. expenditures in this area)
Department of Commerce (37%)
Department of Transportation
(37%)
Department of Defense (12.5%)

Department of Interior (6%)

National Science Foundation
(NSF) (3%)
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) (1.5%)
Department of State (State) (0.7%)
Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW) (0.3%)

Maritime Administration (MARAD)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA)
U. S. Coast Guard (USCG)
Department of the Navy (Navy)
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)
Defense Advanced Research Project
Agency (ARPA)
Army Corps of Engineers (COE)
Fish and Wildlife Service
National Park Service
Geological Survey
Bureau of Land Management
Bureau of Mines
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation
Office of Saline Water
Office of Water Resources Research
Office of Territorial Affairs
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Reclamation

Federal Drug Administration (FDA)
National Institutes of Health (NIH)
Office of Education (OE)

Energy Research and Development
Administration (ERDA, including
the former AEC) (0.8%)
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) (0.8%)
SmithsonianInstitution (0.2%)

The method of expression of national interests in the world ocean
and the interaction of these interests with national interest in other
areas can become very complex and difficult to perceive as a set
of clearcut issues. Table 2 expresses one way of looking at a matrix
of national values, interests and issues which must be considered
in the formulation of a coherent national ocean policy.

Table 2
U. S. NationalValues, Interestsand Issues in the Use of Ocean Space
National Values
Well-Being
(Security)
Influence (National
Presence)

Respect
(Nationalism)

Related
Ocean Interests
National Security
Policies
Operative National
Ocean Policy
Marine Transportation
Resource Exploitation
Naval Forces
Law of the Sea
Negotiations
Sea Power
Operative National
Ocean Policy

Wealth (Power)

Resource Exploitation
Marine Capital
Investment
Marine Transportation

Knowledge
(Science)

Marine Sciences
Ocean Engineering
Sciences
Trained Manpower
Information Exchange

Skill (Technology)

Ocean Engineering
Marine Engineering
Trained Manpower

Rectitude
(Distributive
Justice)

Enlightened SelfInterest in Ocean
Activities
Enlightened Leadership
in Law of the Sea
Assistance Programs for
Developing Coastal
States

Kinship (Altruism)

Issues
National Ocean
Commitment
Adequate Naval Forces
Allocation of Funding
Rights of Use for
Passage, Exploration
and Exploitation
Trade and Security
Agreement
Better National
Organization for
Ocean Activities
Development of National
Ocean Policy
Resource Zone Defined
Common Heritage
Principle
Scientific and Technology Transfer
Marine Pollution
Freedom of Scientific
Research
National Ocean
Commitment
International Scientific
Cooperation
National Ocean
Commitment
Investment of Private
Capital
Marine Pollution
Maintenance of Preeminence as a Sea
Power for World
Stability
Scientific and Technology Transfer to
Developing Coastal
States
Resource Sharing

The notion of national ocean policy certainly is not something
that can be ascribed to a new "wave" in ocean studies as the next
vogue following scholarly concerns about law of the sea, the energy
4
problem, the world ocean for food, energy, and mineral resources.
4. Before the 1970's, most of the literature in this area dealt either with
specific, limited issues (i.e., sea-based deterrence, fisheries, etc.) or grand
maritime strategy (i.e., Mahan, Corbett, etc.). The problem is not so much
in the lack of material as it is in knowing under what headings to look
for it.
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It is, in fact, a logical extension of man's evolving capabilities of
the past 25 years to expand and exploit diverse activities on and
in ocean space. Simply put, since World War II, the world ocean
itself has become a place of intrinsic value rather than a two-dimensional medium for the projection of national power, commerce and
other activities related to use of the air-sea interface alone.
In the evolution of naval warfare, the advent of deep diving, missile-armed nuclear submarines for both conventional attack roles,
and nuclear deterrence have placed some of the most fearsome
weapons of warfare well beneath the surface of the world ocean.
Here, reliable detection and countermeasures seem quite implausible for the immediate future. In addition, explorers (in most cases
supported by Navy research funds) have plumbed the depths of
the deepest places in the world ocean, successfully demonstrating
that the major, developed maritime nations have the technological
and scientific capability to in fact go to any place in the breadth
and depth of the world ocean.
Since World War II, the development of the offshore petroleum
industry for gas and oil exploitation has produced the technological
capability to produce increasingly great quantities of these vital resources from the floor of the ocean throughout the world. By 1980,
it is estimated that 25-42 percent of the world's petroleum will be
produced from undersea deposits. 5
While petroleum from the seafloor receives most of the attention
in considerations of nonliving ocean resources, in fact, there are several other promising mineral resources that have great economic
potential. Among these are manganese and phosphorite nodules,
sands and gravels, mineral rich muds, and sulphur. These resources
can be extracted from on and beneath the seafloor in water depths
ranging from a few hundred feet to over 18,000 feet. The manganese nodules represent an important source of manganese, copper,
cobalt and nickel, while phosphorite nodules are an excellent potential source of phosphates for agricultural purposes. Even the
prosaic sands and gravels will be increasingly valuable to the construction industry as onshore deposits become unavailable. The scientific knowledge and technology exist in most cases, and by 1980,
5. For an excellent overview of the complex issues involved in offshore

petroleum exploitation, see D.E. KAsu, ENERGY UNDER THE OcEANs (1973).

these and other marine hard mineral extraction activities will become a major factor in ocean resource development.0
The convergence of scientific knowledge gained through accelerated ocean research programs, with an increasing application of
sophisticated technology to the ocean environment has given the
developed maritime nations-which probably number no more than
12-the capability to exploit and use the world ocean that is considerably more sophisticated than their ability to govern and regulate these activities in harmony with the world family of nations.
Given that there are approximately 1207 coastal States in the world
today, with probably less than ten percent considered major maritime powers, there is no difficulty in appreciating the concern of
the other 110 or so coastal nations which view -themselves as being
unable to participate in the increasing beneficial uses of ocean space.
It is the stresses set up by this feeling of being left out of the last
physical frontier on this planet that have activated so much of the
ill will and the intransigent behavior of these States in law of the
sea negotiations. Clearly, some means beyond the current proposals
in law of the sea must be developed to assist developing nations
in assuring self-interest in the exploitation of ocean space. The
plans developed by the major maritime powers must also aim for
the convergence of mutual interest between themselves and the developing coastal States. Any other scheme will prove both hazardous in the long run and unworkable for the interests of the maritime powers as well as the developing nations. Therefore, it is imperative for United States national policymakers to exercise some
leadership with respect to development of a coherent and intelligent
ocean policy for a total approach to uses of ocean space. If we
cannot have domestic leadership, it is almost impossible to suppose
that we can help guide the less developed nations in achieving the
ame interests.
The proposition of an overall national ocean policy is neither theoretical nor unworkable. Several of the major maritime states have
already begun programs of varying success and complexity with
respect to organizing their national approach to uses of the world
ocean. For example, the Soviet Union has a highly orchestrated
and coordinated program. It expresses their national interests
6. A comprehensive review of offshore mining is given in MARINE BOARD,
NATIONAL RESEARCH Com'xcI, AmiNG iN THE OuTER CoNTInENTAL SHELF
A IN THE DEEP OCEAN (National Academy of Sciences, 1975).

7. Alexander, GEoGRAPHIcAL FACTORS AN

THE PATTERNS or ALIGNmENT,

in PERSPECTIVEs ON OCEAN PoLicy (National Science Foundation 75-17,
1975).
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through organized operations of all elements of their uses of the
sea from the distribution and activities of their naval forces to the
ubiquitous conduct and appearance of their fishing fleets throughout
the world.8 The Soviet Union carefully programs its naval and
maritime capabilities to export and represent its interests and ideologies.9 This is not to say their execution is flawless. It has
been noted at several international conferences that the Soviet delegations, reflective of their highly structured and rigid bureaucracy,
have been found to lack the flexibility which should be inherent
in a carefully conceived program of national maritime policy. Another good example is the government of Japan which through its
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has developed
a very substantial working relationship between industry and the
government in planning and developing -national maritime interests.10 Even though the Japanese have only a nominal naval force
in their Maritime Self Defense Force, their capability to create a
world-wide maritime presence -through their merchant and fishing
fleets, extensive sales of new construction ships, and marketing of
offshore technology have demonstrated a coherent and well-oiled
national program for uses of ocean space. Other major maritime nations such as France, England, and Canada have also demonstrated
an ability to coherently program their maritime interests through
coordinated government support of all elements that go into their
national maritime activities. This is not the case in the United
States.
While it would be interesting and useful to do an essay on the
"comparative anatomy" of the various ocean policy processes in foreign nations, the intention here merely is to indicate that the notion
of a national ocean policy is already a practice in some States. It
would be hard to address the situation facing the United States
8. For the general methodology of Soviet policy orchestration, see M.
HARVEY,

SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY AS

AN INSTRUMENT

OF SOVIET POLICY

(Monographs in International Affairs, Center for Advanced International
Studies, University of Miami, Fla., 1972).
9. A good overview of this subject is in M. McGuIRE, SOVIET NAVAL POLIcY-OBJECTrIVEs

AND

CONSTmANTS (Praeger Special Studies in International

Politics and Government, New York, 1975).
10. For an example of extensive coordination in one area, see

JAPAN ENGINEERING COMIVITTEE ON OCEAN RESOURCES, STATUS REPORT Or SEA-BED ExPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION TECHNOLOGY IN JAPAN (Tokyo, 1972).

without having some knowledge and cognizance of what is being
done in other nations. The United States is today the preeminent
maritime power in the free world, but this is a power point that
we are passing through. There is a great deal that must be done
to improve the management and application of United States national policies in representing its interests in and on the world
ocean. Those who would suggest that the status quo is perfectly
adequate for the intermediate term do not understand the unfavorable nature of the principal trends used to measure the viability
of sea power in the case of the United States.
In order to put to rest the arguments that would favor the status
quo, it is useful to cite some of the unfavorable trends to demonstrate that the present course of action for the United States can
only lead to a situation of its being a second class maritime powera situation hardly commensurate or supportive of the policies set
forth by the Government in other areas of national representation on the international scene.
In naval forces, -the United States is perilously close to being the
second largest navy in the world, behind the Soviet Union, due to
the sizable differential between their rate of construction of major
warships and the rate of construction within the yards in the United
States. While most naval experts agree that this is not true at this
moment, the situation could easily change in balance within the next
year or two. Of course, this is not just a numbers game; both quality
and quantity are involved. The prestigious Jane's Fighting
Ships,1 1 for the last three years, has indicated with some alarm
this precarious trend towards being in second place. The United
States Navy, for example, has shrunk from over 1,000 ships in 1968
to about 480 today; -thesmallest fleet since 1939.
The United States, a nation which is intimately dependent on marine trade with the entire world for its own well-being and markets
for its goods, in 1974 only carried six percent of its cargo exports
in United States flag ships. 12 In 1960, -the figure was 11 percent.
Yet, most maritime experts agree that a healthy proportion of own
flag ship carriage of trade should be in the order of 40 percent to
45 percent for a major maritime state. The ability to achieve this
level, an order of ten times more than what is being done now, is
virtually impossible, given the present rate of development of the
United States merchant marine. This is not to say the United
11.

JANE'S FIGHTING

SmPs 1974-1975, at 73-78 (J. Moore ed. 1974).

12. MARITIME ADMIISTmTION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMENCE, THE ANNUAL
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR

1974, at 90 (1975).
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States is not capable of designing and building ships which -rank
with the most modern in the world. It merely means that the allocation of priorities is somewhat faulty in failing to maintain this
strong bulwark of national maritime health. 13 Present trends suggest only a nominal United States merchant marine capability within ten to 15 years.
In ocean fisheries, the United States ranks sixth in the world;
however, this figure is somewhat misleading since the actual figures
of tonnages landed indicate that the relative size of the United
States fisheries industry is only four percent of the total world
tonnage 'of fish caught. 14 Most of the fisheries in the United States

operate on a subsistence basis and probably cannot become solid
business enterprises without considerable infusions of new capital
and governmental attention directed towards enlightened support
and regulation. This situation is not aided by the fact that United
States coastal fisheries generally must compete against highly
mechanized, foreign fleets in international waters paralleling our
coastline. One would have to make the conclusion with respect
to fisheries in the United States that it is not a nationally important business, politics and regional factions notwithstanding.
With most of the key sea power indices more or less pointed
downward, the future growth of the United States' presence in the
world oceans is not as rosy as the current, instantaneous situation
might indicate. Since all of these trends are not turned around
within days, months or even years, it is incumbent for national policy planners to picture an integration of these issues, these downward trends, and to comprehend what these trends are telling us.
This is not an idle expression of national sovereignty, an international "machismo," but rather a very pragmatic requirement to ensure that the self-interests of the United States are represented
throughout the 71 percent of our planet that is covered by the seas.
Within the current law of the sea negotiations, it is clear that
13. In World War II, Henry J. Kaiser shipyard built a Liberty Ship in
four days and 11 hours, a convincing demonstration of industrial knowhow when policy, capital and resources were put behind an effort. See J.
BUNKER, LBERTv SnIPs (1972).

14. The United States fishing industry supplies about 2.7 million tons of
the world catch of about 66 millions tons, or about four percent. U.N./FAO.
36 YEARBOOK OF FISHERIES STATISTICS 12 (1973).

the United States, by almost any formula, will gain the largest piece
of territory among the 151 nations in the world through the creation
of the economic zone. This will be in the order of 2,222,000 square
miles (nautical). 15 In addition, it is also clear that the major
maritime powers will continue to employ their total national array

of sea power elements to further their interests within the political
world. The United States must be in a position to intelligently
organize its response and to map out its strategy and tactics for
maintaining presence and maritime capability throughout the world
ocean to be the major sea power. The status quo of the present
will not lead to this situation in the future.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE--WHENCE WE CAME

For nearly two hundred years, the United States has had a foreign policy which has served as a deliberate expression of the will
of the Government as to how the United States saw its interactive
role with other nations of the world. The foreign policy of the
United States is expressed through an annual planning and documentation process setting forth both the current foreign policy and
subsidiary policies of this nation, together with an indication of how
this policy has been carried out in the past, how it is being carried
out at present and the plan for the future. In addition, it indicates
the operative agencies and some idea of the budget to be allocated
for this process. Few would argue that such a coherent planning
process is unnecessary due to the wide variety and depth of commitments the United States has in its involvement with the rest of
the world. Nevertheless, in a similar situation where there is continuing and expanding concern for the United States national role
in the world ocean, there is no prospect of such a centralized and
deliberate planning process. A review of governmental statements
on the ocean policy-related issues indicates that there does not seem
to be much official concern expressed about the lack of process in
this area. The world's population lives only on the 29 percent of
our planet that is not covered by the oceans; nevertheless, there
is a set of specific ocean issues which require creation of a national
ocean policy plan closely coordinated with our foreign policy, its
development and conduct.
The de facto ocean policy of the United States over the past two
hundred years has been a series of events which if plotted on a
graph would resemble a sawtooth curve. That is, we have risen
15. Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone
on the Law of the Sea, 12 SAN DiEao L. REv. 569, 574 (1975).
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on occasions to considerable greatness in the exercise of our maritime interests only to fall back into situations of manifest disrepair
once the crisis was over. Generally. speaking, these crises took the
form of war-like actions where the national degree of dependence
on the oceans was suddenly impressed on American policy planners.
Such a sawtooth progression is no longer satisfactory in the present
complex world; there is insufficient time in the course of modem
events to effectively organize maritime capabilities at the last minute when a world crisis develops. More than ever, preparedness
must be maintained.
The history of maritime policy development in the United States
through the 1950's is largely the history of the United States Navy.
While there have been some significant exceptions, this is sufficiently correct to illustrate the point here. Within the executive
branch, the maritime advice given to the President traditionally
came from the Secretary of the Navy, a member of his cabinet,
prior to passage of the National Security Act of 1947. In the establishment and organization of the United States Navy, the Congress
created the post of Secretary of the Navy as a member of the President's cabinet in 1798, after approximately 24 years of experimenting with other various schemes of management of this organization
through such bodies as an Admiralty Board, a Secretary of the Marine, Agent of Marine, etc., with the direction for this management
often coming from Congress itself. They recognized finally in 1798
that the full management of the Navy properly belonged in the
hands of the President for the day-to-day conduct of its activities.16 The early concern with maritime affairs is found in the
language of the Constitution (in force in 1789) which provides that
the United States shall "provide and maintain a navy" but should
only "raise and support armies," with no appropriation of money
for the Army lasting for a term longer than two years. 17 The
Navy did not provide a domestic threat to good order and was considered an important adjunct for extension of national interests beyond the shorelines of the nation. In "maintaining a Navy," it was
the intent of the Congress that the Secretary of the Navy should
16. For the historical development of naval (maritime) administration
and policy in the United States, see C.
NAVAL ADmSTRATION 1775-1911 (1968).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

PAULON,

PAULLN's HISTORY OF

be the principal sea power advisor to the President, as well as the
administration's principal contact with the Congress with respect
to naval matters. This was especially true after 1815.18 But, the
term "naval matters" had a very broad construction, and it was
the intent of the Congress that the Secretary of the Navy should
be concerned with most questions related to uses of the sea and
the protection of United States interests upon the seas. The principal uses of the sea in the 19th century related to uses of naval
units for the purposes of exploration, projection of United States
interests abroad, territorial acquisition, and the development and
protection of United States maritime trade. The major commercial
maritime activities of significance at that time were the merchant,
fishing and whaling fleets operating throughout the world. In the
1840's, Lieutenant M.F. Maury of the Navy became "the father of
oceanography" through his world-acclaimed studies of ocean phenomena. These studies were tied to United States desires to im19
prove the efficiency of its merchant, fishing and whaling fleets.
Within the Congress itself, Naval Affairs Committees were established in both houses by the mid-1800's, and these bodies were able
to look at the question of national uses of the sea in a unified manner. Thus, throughout almost the entire 19th century and the first
five decades of the 20th century, naval affairs and maritime affairs
were reasonably well represented at the highest policy levels of the
Government as specific sets of topical questions. While this was not
equivalent to having a national ocean policy, in that the principal
business was naval, it did provide a unifying mechanism which essentially made most of the policy concerned with national uses of
the ocean during those times.
In the immediate post World War II years, the structure for the
management of our armed forces was changed to more nearly conform to the situation of having virtually three principal autonomous armed forces; the Army, the Navy and a proposed Air Force
(to be formed from the Army Air Corps). The business of defense
was becoming a much more complicated set of issues. Three separate military departments at the cabinet level would be unworkable
from a managerial point of view and would tend to put an unequal
balance on military issues within the membership of the President's
cabinet. For these and many other reasons, the Department of Defense was created by the National Security Act of 1947. But this
18. For examples of the 19th century use of the Navy in developing

United States ocean policies, see E. ENGLE & A. LOTT, AaERICA'S MAmiTnvi
(1975).
19. Id. at 130-31.

HEmIAGE
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act also had the effect of removing the President's sea power advisor, the Secretary of the Navy, from the cabinet, as he and the
Secretary of War (Army) were replaced on the cabinet by the new
Secretary of Defense. At the same time, the Naval Affairs Committees in both houses of the Congress were disestablished along with
the Military Affairs Committees, which provided congressional
oversight for the Army. New Armed Services Committees were
established for congressional supervision of the three services. So,
as a result of this act which was designed to improve management
of defense, the executive and legislative branches of Government
lost their only unified structure for the consideration of broad maritime issues, imperfect as it was.2 0
Up through the late 1950's, the United States Navy represented
the major national activity in ocean issues. This was especially true
in the support and conduct of ocean science and engineering
through the Office of Naval Research (ONR) which was founded in
1946. In 1950, the National Science Foundation (NSF) was formed,
and it began to take over some of the support of basic ocean sciences.
This NSF responsibility was reflected in a gradual decrease of naval
activities in this area in order to avoid overlap and duplication, as
well as permitting the Navy to concentrate its support on more mission-oriented research support.
Since the 1950's, there have been fairly active efforts in perfecting interagency coordination in marine sciences and later in broader
marine programs, both through executive and congressional initiatives. 21 The difference in these terms lies in the distinction between strict oceanography and a broader context of science, engineering and policy-related programs. This coordination began
with a voluntary confederation through the Office of Naval Research which set up the Coordinating Committee on Oceanography (CCO) in 1956. Since the Navy controlled 70 percent of
the national ocean budget through ONR and the Navy Hydrographic Office, the coordination among the remaining half dozen
20. For an historical treatment of this transition period, see R. ALBION

& R. CONNERY, FORRESTAL AND THE NAVY 250-86 (1968).

21. For a detailed, comprehensive account of these activities from the late
1950's to the early 1970's by a participant, see E. WENK, JR., THE POLrrIcs
OF THE OCEAN (1972).

agencies with ocean interests was not too unwieldy at that time.22
In 1957, the National Academy of Sciences formed its first standing
committee for ocean issues, the National Academy of Sciences
Committee on Oceanography (NASCO). The Academy had done
two previous major studies on oceanography in 1927 and 1949,
but it had not established a body for continuity and follow-up. In
early 1959, NASCO released its report, "Oceanography 1960-1970,"
written in (response to a 1957 request by ONR. This report became
the basis for the first congressional hearings to be held on the subject. In March, 1959, the newly-formed Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee
held its first hearings while the Senate Commerce Committee held
hearings on the NASCO report. The Navy also released its 1958
study, Project TENOC (Ten Years of Oceanography) at this time.
These early activities rather accurately identified the reasons for
greatly increased United States activity in ocean sciences and the
need for some centralized, coordinated framework for the conduct
of this activity. Public and governmental awareness was indeed
stimulated by this burst of federal interest in the oceans; however,
this was also the era of Sputnik (1957) and the formation of NASA
(1958), two events which tended to have even higher visibility and
priority for allocation of resources in the area of science and engineering. Nevertheless, these ocean events involving the National
Academy of Sciences, Navy and Congress established a continuing concern for ocean issues within the Government that persists
to this day. The level of activity in this area has varied greatly
in the past 19 years since ONR's CCO, but the essential interest
has always been there.
In the wake of these early activities, the President's Federal
Council for Science and Technology (FCST) established a Subcommittee on Oceanography in mid-1959. The membership on this subcommittee was composed of representatives of the nine federal
agencies"having oceanographic activities. In 1960, this subcommittee became the Interagency Committee on Oceanography (ICO).
While it reported to the FCST, it was largely functional only in
an advisory and coordinating framework. It had no authority to
require any of the member agencies to initiate, terminate or coordinate oceanography programs. Chaired by the Assistant Secre22. These were the Coast Guard (Treasury Department), Maritime Administration (Commerce Department), Bureau of Commercial Fisheries
(Interior Department), United States Coast and Geodetic Survey (Commerce Department), Smithsonian Institution, and the Atomic Energy Commission.,
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tary of the Navy for its entire existence, the ICO was nevertheless
successful in getting a good focus on oceanographic activities supported by the federal government. 23 Given other forces which
were in competition with oceanography at the time, the ICO was
remarkably successful in bringing the first basic coordination and
cooperation to the federal ocean science community.
Congressional discomfort with the executive branch was primarily based on their perception that the President was not moving
fast enough to implement the recommendations of the NASCO report and did not share their sense of urgency to get going in oceanography. This was evidenced by the many bills introduced on this
subject in the late 1950's and early 1960's. By the mid-1960's, there
was a virtual blizzard of congressional activity in the form of hearings and proposed legislation. This was set against a general background of criticism of the administration's overall management and
policy for all sciences. The advocacy for oceanography was part
of the larger picture. The main criticism in the ocean area was
the lack of coherent, coordinated management by the executive
branch. No one was in charge who had both the responsibility and
the authority. The problems had been identified, but there seemed
to be no effort to organize for their solution within the federal government.
In 1965, landmark hearings were held to define how the federal
ocean program should be structured and managed. It was the sense
of the Congress that it would send to the President a bill that would
get something done soon. The author testified at the hearings
held by the House Subcommittee on Oceanography, pointing out
that while the context of the ocean dialogue since the NASCO report had been largely related to oceanography, that in fact, both
technology and ocean policy were equally important to a balanced
national program. Science (i.e., oceanography) was only knowledge
about the ocean environment and its potential. Engineering showed
us how to use that knowledge to do useful work in the oceans, while
marine policy provided the political governance and policy direction
for these activities.
23. The ICO was also responsible for a considerable series of government reports on various aspects of the United States oceanographic activities ranging from deep submersibles to education of trained manpower.

As a result of intensive (and sometimes fiery) House and Senate
cooperation, together with the affirmative action of President Johnson (despite vigorous objections from some of his staff), the Marine
Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 was enacted
in June, 1966.24 This became the baseline legislation for national
ocean issues which were to be the subject of additional congressional initiatives (amendments) in the years to follow.
The 1966 Act essentially recognized the basic, complex questions
involved in how to best organize the United States ocean program.
It established two bodies to deal with the issues. The first was
the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources to
develop the recommendations for the long-range management of
the program. It was composed of persons outside the Government,
appointed by the President to advise him and the Congress on the
best overall national plan. The chairman of this group was Dr.
Julius Stratton, President Emeritus of MIT, whose name became
the unofficial reference to the Commission's final report: "The
5
2

Stratton Report.1

The second body was an executive branch coordinating group,
the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development. This organization was to provide an improved interagency
coordinating mechanism with both authority and responsibility to
assist the President in managing the United States ocean program,
as well as preparation of new legislative initiatives in this area for
transmittal to the Congress. The Chairman of the Council was the
Vice-President.
It should be remembered that the theme was still strongly that
of "oceanography." The 1966 Act used the term "marine science"
as the key concept despite the more broad title of the act. But
by generous interpretation, one could say that the act provided a
legal basis for a much more broad construction of the congressional
mandate. The act also wisely took notice of the bureaucratic
propensity to perpetuate itself by requiring the Commission to submit its final report within 18 months of the date of its formation
and that it would expire 20 days later. The Council was to expire
120 days after the presentation of the Commission's final report.
Nevertheless, bureaucracy triumphed and the act was amended four
times in extending the life of the Commission to 24 months and
the life of the Council from about 28 months to about 60 months.
24. Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1101

(1970).
25.

CO1vIxISSION

ON MAPMIE SCENCE,

ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES,

NATION AND THE SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL

AcTIoN (1969).

OUR
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The works of both the Stratton Commission and the Council were
sufficiently broad to provide the basic framework of a national
ocean program together with an implied national ocean policy. Unfortunately, the administration was slow in acting on the Stratton
Report, which was released in January, 1969. It was not until 18
months later that any major action was taken on the Commission's
recommendations. Also, the bold statements and recommendations
provided by the Council's series of annual reports to the President
and Congress did not inspire any particular great surge of administration activity in the development of an integrated national oceai
program.
By the end of 1969, President Nixon had appointed a special President's Task Force on Oceanography which was to consider the administration response to the Commission recommendations and an
increasing volume of congressional criticism. This group recommended the creation of a National Marine Agency that would report
directly to the President for the purposes of coordinating the national ocean program. This was not as strong an institutional recommendation as the independent agency, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), recommended by Stratton's
report, but it was better than the status quo. It was a beginning.
In July, 1970, the administration made its move. A "dependent"
civil ocean agency was created through a presidential reorganization plan.26 The agency created was the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the same title used by the
Stratton Commission, but it was not independent in this case; it
was under the Department of Commerce. But even at this juncture, the decision did not proceed as smoothly as expected, and there
was a lively jurisdictional dispute between the Departments of Interior and Commerce as to which department would have NOAA.
Today, five years later, there are still some bad memories and scars
of this episode in both departments.
The Navy, Department of Interior, Coast Guard, NSF and the
Army (Corps of Engineers) all gave up certain, mostly minor, programs to the new agency as the bulk (except Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries from the Department of Interior) of its new activities
26. Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 4, to establish the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, July 9, 1970.

came from within the Department of Commerce itself.27
It should be added at this point that the National Academy of
Sciences' NASCO evolved into an Ocean Affairs Board, an elevation
in status, in the early 1970's, but its influence never quite equalled
that of the NASCO of 1959. This was not due to its membership
or management, but to the changed nature of "political oceanography." In addition, the National Academy of Engineering also
created an advisory committee for ocean engineering in 1967. In
the early 1970's, this committee was also elevated in status and
changed to the Marine Board, an organization which has been responsible for many important analytical reports on engineering aspects of national ocean development. The Government as the principal "customer" of the two academies has had the advantage of
(relatively) objective advice from the two academies with respect
to ocean science and engineering, although the specific question of
national ocean policy has not yet been addressed by either group.
On April 30, 1971, the Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development was terminated, two months short of its statutory
expiration. For approximately three months, there was no interagency coordinating group while the FCST and other agencies tried
to work out a new setup. By the late summer of 1971, the FCST
created the Interagency Committee on Marine Science and Engineering (ICMSE) to carry on this function; however, this new
group seemed to be a faded copy of the old ICO. It was purely
a cooperative, coordinating body, and although it did carry on the
annual reports required by the 1966 Act, its efforts really have not
had a very great impact. Today, ICMSE provides a forum for the
representatives from the federal organizations with ,ocean programs
to meet for discussion of their programs. In addition, they have
been tasked to do various studies that are passed to them by the
FCST and other agencies where -there appears to be interagency
interests involved But without anyone in charge, the averaging
process of accommodating each agency's concerns and interest
creates more intellectual oatmeal than caviar.
A second significant Stratton Commission organizational recommendation, other than NOAA, was a presidentially-appointed advisory council to review national ocean programs and to report annually to the President and Congress. The President did not act
on this recommendation (as was the case with most of the other
recommendations), and it was up to the Congress to create this body
27. Transfers to Secretary of Commerce, id., section 1; Abolition, id.,
section 6.
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through legislation. The bill creating the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA) was signed into law
on August 15, 1971.28 The membership of the NACOA is made
up from prominent citizens from the nongovernment community
representing diverse relationships to the national ocean interests.
The 25-member body, among others, consists of academics, industrialists, union leaders, state political leaders and information media
executives. The NACOA has done well in its four years of existence, considering its broad membership and its innate advisory role.
The annual reports of NACOA, while not as hard-hitting as some
"ocean activists" would like, have been models of trenchant observation and comment on important topical areas relating to United
States ocean interests. The real proof seems to lie with the gradual
trend, indicating that the influence of NACOA, through its reports
to the President and Congress, has continued to increase year by
year. It is the kind of evolutionary growth that may result in
NACOA's establishing an important and impartial (relatively
speaking) presence in advising the executive and legislative
branches of Government on ocean affairs.
There is a wide scope of activity represented by those agencies
which share the $2,064,200,000 a year federal appropriation for ocean
sciences and marine affairs. 29 While this figure does not uniquely
define all national activities in the ocean (for example, it omits cost
of Navy ships, their development and operational costs), it does provide a good index for measurement of diversity in the allocation
of resources for our national interest in the world ocean. There
is a partial coordination mechanism (ICMSE) to provide interagency planning prior to entering the budget process in support
of funding requirements for marine programs. The effectiveness
and breadth of this coordination is, of course, another question.
It is suggested that two key events have accentuated the inherently weak position of the United States ocean policy apparatus.
The first was the loss of the President's sea power advisor and related congressional committees as a result of the National Security
Act of 1947. The second was the increasing, worldwide, scientific,
technical and economic capability to achieve more extensive uses
28. National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, 33 U.S.C.

§ 857-6 (Supp. I, 1971).

29. U.S. GENmEAL AccouTmG OmcA supra note 1, at 34.

of ocean space. These events combined to provide an increasingly
difficult situation where the lack of an overall ocean policy "road
map" for orderly planning and programming becomes a chronic, severe problem in the dynamic maritime environment of today.
Today the diffuse situation in the management of ocean issues
in the United States is demonstrated by the fact that all major maritime functions in the executive branch are initiated and conducted
at levels below the cabinet level. In the case of the Congress, oversight and appropriations responsibilities are spread among many
committees. Table 3 illustrates this problem which is reflective of
the "division of labor" within the executive branch. In this situation, lack of coordination and focus on the overall general set of
issues is a logical expectation.
Table 3
CongressionalCommittees Regularly Involved in Marine Issues*
Senate
Committee
Appropriations
Armed Services
Commerce
Foreign Relations
Interior and Insular Affairs
Labor and Public Welfare
Public Works
House
Appropriations
Armed Services
Government Operations
Interstate and Foreign

Commerce

Subcommittee (s)
(various)
(various)
Merchant Marine
Oceans and Atmosphere
Oceans and International
Environment
Mineral, Materials and Fuels
National Science Foundation
(various)
(various)
Sea Power
(various)

(various)

(various)
Coast Guard and Navigation
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment
Merchant Marine
Oceanography
(various)
Science and Astronautics
* There are, of course, other committees which take up ocean issues on an
ad hoc basis. The intention here is to simply illustrate the diversity of
paths these issues face on a regular basis within the legislative branch.
Source: CongressionalDirectory, GPO
Judiciary
Merchant Marine and Fisheries
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Under the existing federal institutional framework, the prospects
for a coherent national ocean policy are extremely dim. There is
simply no way at present in which effective, continuous coordination and programming can be accomplished with advice and counsel
being provided to the President and Congress on a regular basis.
A new framework must be established to accomplish this purpose.
A simple agreement to the proposition that a national ocean policy
should exist and should be made operative is an insufficient condition to ensure that it can be effectively carried out under the present organizational framework. The framework itself must undergo
some changes.
WHY A NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY

A rough outline of the reasons for a national ocean policy has
been developed throughout this essay. However, a more detailed
look should be taken at the specific conditions which require such
a policy to be developed by the Government at the soonest possible
time before considering how it might be accomplished. These conditions roughly fall into four categories; economic, political, idealogical, and military. Each of these elements or combinations of them
tend to form the basis for the increasing difficulty being faced by
the United States. As noted earlier, there are some 120 coastal
States in the world, a figure that is bound to increase: no more than
a dozen are developed maritime powers.
Thus, we see that approximately 72 percent of the separate nation
states in existence today are developing coastal States and that they
clearly are in the majority voting representation in the various international forums.
The economic issue is perhaps the most realistic basis for appreciating the diverse international pressures for uses of ocean space.
The oceans are regarded by the great majority of the world's nations as the last free resource area left on this planet. They are
a source of both living and nonliving resources which are perceived
to be vital to the effective development of the third and fourth
world nations, despite the fact that in recent years there have been
serious doubts raised by ocean economic analysts. These doubts are
concerned with whether or not such resource probabilities do, in
fact, exist in the order and scale considered necessary to alleviate
the misery and underdeveloped situation of the majority of the

world's population. Nevertheless, as with many other areas of international diplomacy, the perception of real relief for economic
hardship is more than sufficient to create a whole host of problems
for ocean policymakers in the many decades to come.
Beyond the simple intrinsic value of the world ocean as a source
of resources, there is also the use of the oceans as a highway for
the conduct of world trade. With the advancement of third and
fourth world nations, their increasing sophistication and economic
well-being forces the demand for creating expanded world maritime
trade. At present nearly 99 percent of all world trade is carried
in ships at some point in the journey between manufacturer and
the final marketplace. This fraction will remain constant as the
overall volume of world trade increases dramatically in order to
meet the demands of the developing world, as well as to supply
the vitally needed resources and markets for the developed nations.
The political/ideological questions that will influence future decisions for ocean space are largely governed by the expressed desires
of the developing world to have a fair share (by their definition)
of the existing and future wealth of the world on an accelerated
basis. The articulation of these desires will be realized through
both existing and new world political alignments conditioned by
a mutuality of interests among nations affiliated for geographic,
cultural, political, or ideological reasons. These groupings will constitute physical and voting forces which will to a large extent condition or moderate future uses of ocean space on a regional rather
than a world basis. It seems unlikely that any such grouping or
coalition will have significant power over total ocean space, but
rather they will provide certain problems that must be met and
dealt with in localized areas, primarily coastal in nature. They will
also provide opportunities to extend major power (U.S.S.R., China,
United States, etc.) ideological conflicts into new modes of alignments.
The power of such groupings in world forums has been dramatically demonstrated within the past two years in the block voting
of the developing world in the United Nations in passing resolutions
which were often inimicable to the best interests of the United
States. It is certain that such activities will increase with respect
to ocean space through the current law of the sea negotiations. To
view such situations in an equitable manner, fair to both the United
States and the interest of these blocks, the United States must have
a well-formulated policy of response and counteraction. While it
is doubtful that the developing world coalitions can exercise significant power in other resource areas similar to the Middle Eastern
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oil monopoly, it will be a continuing concern of both our foreign
policy and hopefully our emergent ocean policy to look at the ques-

tion of resource politics and their influence on our national and
ocean interests.
Perhaps the most immediate question faced by United States
ocean policymakers in the nearer term is the claim for increased
control over ocean space by the developing coastal States. It should
be kept in mind that there is nothing particularly sacred about a
200-mile or any spatial claim. 30 Claims considerably exceeding this
almost undoubtedly will be a feature of future ocean politics. Since
such claims, through creeping jurisdiction, are based on arbitrary
political decisions more than on a resource or geographic basis, it
is clear that holding the line on a 200-mile limit provides no real
future guarantees. For the near term, whether or not there is a
comprehensive law of the sea treaty produced at the current law
of the sea negotiations, the real challenges facing our policy
planners with respect to ocean space will remain about the same.
In both cases, a treaty or "nontreaty," there will be sweeping
changes in the existing political geography of the world ocean. Almost every one of these changes will operate to the detriment of
the United States and its traditional world uses of the ocean space.
The principal exception will be our acquisition of the immense economic zone off our coastlines. So while the situation is not entirely
negative with respect to United States interests, it will provide an
entirely new framework of how we exercise our maritime interests
throughout the world.
The military question for ocean space is, of course, tied closely
to the two foregoing issues of economic and political/ideological
questions. The present roles of the Navy fall into four categories;
strategic nuclear deterrence, sea control, projection of national
power, and naval presence. 81 While these roles of the Navy will
essentially remain the same in broad characterization, it is recognized that the changes in the political character of the world ocean
will require a rebalancing of effort within these traditional roles.
30. For an excellent case study on one such arbitrary but historical limit,
SWARTZTRAUBEP, THE THREE MiLE LIVIT OF TERIuTORIAL SEAs (1972).
31. A complete discussion and analysis of the missions of the Navy is
given in Turner, Missions of the U.S. Navy, 26 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Rsv.
2-17 (.1974).

see S.

The mission of the United States Navy as the principal United
States military force concerned with the world ocean will become
more complex. This complexity will come principally through use
denial of large areas of ocean space which will come under the real
or claimed jurisdiction of foreign coastal States. For example, one
of the key issues facing the United States in the law of the sea
conferences is the maintenance of the principle of unobstructed
transit through world straits. This principle is particularly vital
for the effective operation of naval forces. The United States
cannot subscribe to a situation where it would have to ask permission from the adjacent coastal State(s) in order to send our naval
vessels through straits that have been used traditionally for hundreds of years for this purpose. In addition, United States military
planners must consider how to protect an increasingly diverse pattern of United States interests and activities on and in the world
ocean. The stress and confrontation between the United States and
the Soviet Union will certainly continue to be a major problem in
the future. However, there is also the greatly expanded prospect
for low-level naval conflicts in the distant coastal regions where
developing States press for claims and demands that cannot be accommodated by our Government. These situations can result in
exercise of military force on a limited and quick reaction basis to
protect legitimate United States interests in these areas. The difficulty of doing this will be aggravated by reduction of both available
foreign bases and the gradual enclosure movement of ocean space
through creeping jurisdiction. This will require considerable recasting of the traditional roles of the Navy in supporting different
operational patterns of United States maritime interests. Such a
recasting has far-reaching implications in terms of resource allocation for assuring the appropriate shape and size of the Navy of the
future.
As a related issue, the maritime police function which is conducted by the United States Coast Guard also will be required to
undergo considerable changes.3 2 With the 200-mile expanded resource zone almost a certainty, together with increased utilization
of the coastal zone by all types of resource exploitation activities,
this agency will be faced with dramatically increased responsibilities in the regulation, governance and policing of both United States
and foreign activities within this zone. This is an ocean policy issue
since the Coast Guard, as presently constituted, will need consider32. For a detailed review by the Commandant of the Coast Guard of
present and projected USCG missions, see Siler, The Coast Guard-A Variety of Tasks, New and Old, for the Multi-Mission Service, SEA POWER MAGAznE, Jan., 1975, at 17-22.
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able added assets and resources to adequately face these problems
of the near future. The Coast Guard will be tasked with the principal role of the policing and regulatory functions in the coastal and
resource zones surrounding the United States and its possessions.
There are many activities conducted today in this region which do
not directly involve the Coast Guard, but many experts believe that
there will be a gradual assignment to this agency of virtually the
entire regulatory responsibility for this region. This is a several
hundred million dollar question for resources that ultimately will
be required by the Coast Guard to meet the challenges of the future.
How NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY SHOULD BE FoRImULATED:
CONCEPTS AND OPTIONS

There are two primary goals to be met in the development of
a proper management framework for the development and conduct
of national ocean policy. The first is to provide continuous, evaluated policy information and recommendations to the highest levels
of the executive and legislative branches of Government. The second is to unify and harmonize the various mission-related activities
of the many federal organizations which have marine science and
ocean affairs programs.
In the first case, the requirement is to ensure that some single
entity is continuously assessing ocean-related aspects of all major
national and international activities which might affect the United
States and its overall national policy objectives. This implies certain assigned levels of responsibility and authority.
In the second case, the intention is to bring together and to focus
the collective energies of the many agencies working in this area
in order to avoid duplication and waste, through more wisely managing the people and capital resources allocated for these purposes.
There are many institutional ways of achieving the goals cited
above. At one end of the scale might be the superagency, "wet
NASA" concept, proposed in the mid-1960's by several congressional
leaders. 33 At the other end would be the simple continuation of
the status quo with nothing more than a slight improvement in
the existing consultative arrangements for coordination of the Fed33. Notably by Congressman Bob Wilson of California (San Diego).

eral Ocean Program 4 as outlined earlier in this paper. These extremes might be collectively entitled "from doing too much to doing
too little."
In fact, there are some reasonable new schemes which could readily accommodate the contemporary needs of the United States government, meeting most of the requirements for the formulation of
a coherent and cohesive national ocean policy. Most of them would
require little in the way of a radical change in existing management, but they would require a presidential level commitment. By
the very nature of the federal bureaucratic process it seems very
unlikely that developing an administrative framework for these
purposes could take place as one giant, bureaucratic step. Thus,
it is considered a remote possibility that the United States will have
a cabinet level maritime department (i.e., "Ministry of the Marine")
in the near future, although some students of this question have
made this suggestion. 35 Also, it is very doubtful that the Navy
would be included due to its close integration in the Department
of Defense. Such a specialized departmental organization may be
possible in the future through an evolutionary progression of events
which will take place over a period of several years, through the
gradual development and integration of the national marine programs within the United States. One only has to look at the past
history of attempts to make changes in federal cabinet level departments to appreciate the difficulties of bringing a new cabinet level
position into being without a transition through more modest administrative changes that are wholly within the enacting power of
the chief executive.
It is believed that the best immediate solution is an independent
80
federal agency/administration reporting directly to the President.
34. The Federal Council for Science and Technology, through the Interagency Committee for Marine Science and Engineering, is required in accordance with 33 U.S.C. § 1104 (1970) to make an annual report on the
Federal Ocean Program to the President and Congress. The latest report in
that series was issued in December, 1975.
35. See Miller, To Provide for the Common Defenses, SEA POWER MAGAznm, July, 1975, at 12-17; Walsh & George, Do We Need a Secretary of the
Coast Guard?, id., March, 1975, at 21-24.
36. This idea has come closer to fruition than any other proposal. Recent
high-level recommendations have been: 1) the Stratton Commission recommended a "National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency" reporting directly to the President (1969); 2) the President's Task Force on Oceanography recommended a "National Marine Agency" reporting directly to the
President (1970); 3) NACOA's Second and Third Annual Reports (1973 and
1974) called for all civil marine functions to be put together in a single
agency or department. They also specified that "the development of a national marine affairs plan" should be part of this new organization. All
proposals were sufficiently broad in scope to accommodate the authority
and competence to do the national ocean policy function discussed herein.
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By the expediency of executive orders, together with the concurrence of Congress, the President could almost immediately create
a suitable institutional framework to serve the purpose of the development and maintenance of national ocean policy. For example,
an administration, designed similar to the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, might provide the most useful initial step
in developing the required administrative structure. It is further
proposed that the United States Coast Guard, which is the only civil
federal maritime operating agency, be the initial core unit of this
new administration.
This proposition would have two principal, immediate benefits to
the United States. First, it would recognize the special and increasing responsibilities of the Coast Guard for regulation and jurisdiction over widely diversified maritime activities in the United States
coastal zone. 37 Second, by removing the Coast Guard from any
one of the cabinet departments, the situation of potential conflicts
between the aims of the department in which the Coast Guard was
located and the Coast Guard's responsibilities could be largely mitigated. The Coast Guard in an independent agency position could
participate more directly and effectively in the development of all
policies and regulations affecting United States marine activities.
Such functions could easily be expanded to eventually embrace the
world-wide needs of United States national ocean policy. It also
should not be forgotten that the Coast Guard presently does have
some world-wide responsibilities in its regulation over United
States flag vessels and in the maintenance and operation of some
distant navigational aids such as Loran stations.
This proposal makes logical sense for an ultimate, evolutionary
development of an independent government agency that would be
directly involved in the formulation and conduct of national ocean
policy. At a later date, as appropriate, other maritime-related activities within the federal government would be added to the independent agency by executive order to provide additional dimensions
and integration with respect to the management of national maritime activities.
37. See Siler, The Coast Guard-A Variety of Tasks, New and Old, for
the Multi-Mission Service, SA PowER MAeAzIm, Jan., 1975, at 18; Walsh &
George, supra note 35, at 23-24.

This suggestion is not the same thing as the development of a
monolithic, ocean superagency. Many federal organizations have
legitimate, mission-oriented needs to conduct ocean programs at
various levels of activity. The criticism of the present systems lies
with the fact that there is no final arbiter or policy-making agent
that has authority for the adjudication and final resolution of policy matters. No one is in charge. For this reason, the present coordinating framework is rather loose and is largely ineffective for
assuring maximum coordination and cooperation in the best interest
of the United States.38 In addition, the present levels of interagency coordination do not involve all aspects of national maritime
activities, as the emphasis is primarily on ocean science and technology. Therefore, the proposal to better focus national activities and
to provide a final arbiter in this area should not be confused with
a suggestion that a single, omnipotent agency is needed for these
purposes. Generally speaking, the monolithic agency is an administrative extremis, having much more to recommend against it than
for it.
In fact, the term "wet NASA" is not even a very convincing analog for the conceptual notion of a monolithic ocean agency. In the
case of the space program, the capacity and capability for doing
work in space was principally located within two federal organizations, the Department of Defense and NASA. Thus, the resolution
of conflict and competition which did exist needed only to be resolved between two government agencies (and, in fact, not without considerable early difficulty). Furthermore, the space program
and the requisite scientific and technical capability to do work in
space was a recently new phenomenon with no burden of the past.
In the case of national ocean activities we find a historical multiactivity tradition going back aover 200 years. The difficulties of
retrofitting a suitable administrative framework to ongoing activities of such long-standing status is a very difficult bureaucratic
dilemma.
The suggestion to create an independent agency with the Coast
Guard as its initial element is by no means the only reasonable
solution to the problem. A very modest means to provide continuing, evaluated information to the chief executive would be simply
through the establishment of a presidential staff office similar to
that of the former presidential science advisors or his foreign policy
advisor. In this case, the principal person would be the "presidential ocean advisor."
38. US. GENERAL AccouxTTG OrCm,

supra note 1, at 32-33.
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There are also several, less effective variations on how advice can
be provided to the President. A national advisory council could
be created to recommend and to frame national ocean policies for
implementation by the executive and legislative branches where required. This probably should be an explicit assignment that could
be added to the existing National Advisory Committee on the
Oceans and Atmosphere. Another solution might be to develop a
strong national ocean policy function within the staff of the Department of State which would focus the necessary expertise from the
scientific, technical and the diplomatic areas to serve within the
Department in the same way the nation's foreign policy is created.
The Department of State actually recognized the specific importance of ocean issues in 1966 when the post of Special Assistant
to the Secretary of State for Fisheries and Wildlife was established.
In 1970, this was expanded into the Coordinator of Ocean Affairs
and Special Assistant to the Secretary. In 1974, the function
was elevated to assistant secretary status with the creation
of the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs. In the more limited law of
the sea area, the Department of State has also had special assistants
for ocean law located within the Office of the Legal Advisor. But,
format and function are two different things; so far, the Department of State's experiment with an assistant secretary for this area
has not functioned very well. One prominent ocean scientist-statesman turned down the nomination after he had been in consideration
for some time, and the first incumbent, Dr. Dixie Lee Ray (former
head of the AEC), resigned after a short time on the job, protesting that the position really had no influence within State or the
Government.
Any one of these suggestions would certainly be a vast improvement over the situation of today where there is nobody specifically
charged with this responsibility. However, it is clear that administrative panaceas are easy to invent-even those which are perfectly feasible and sensible. The trick is to obtain the concomitant
dedication of good faith and policy support from the highest levels
of the executive and legislative branches. Whatever the institutional solution proposed for ocean policy development and maintenance, it will be an interdependent framework depending upon
firm, high-level commitment to its viability and effectiveness. If

such commitment is not given and maintained, then the new policy
apparatus will be nothing more than another bureaucratic layer in
an already crowded bureaucratic environment.
To those who have studied marine activities and "psuedo-ocean
policy decisions" of the United States government through the past
decade or two, there are many examples that could be cited where
the failure to have a national ocean policy has been detrimental
to effective conduct of our maritime interests in ocean space. Two
examples are presented here by way of supporting this statement.
The first is the rather amorphous history of positions taken by the
United States in the law of the sea negotiations since the first
United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences in 1958 and 1960. Because there was no specified agency within the federal government
charged with the maintenance of policy continuity and development
of consistent national ocean policy, the formulation of positions for
the law of the sea negotiations tended to follow politics as driven
by the more powerful departments of the executive branch. In the
1960's, the Department of Defense initially was very powerful and
insured that its views carried the day through the pure force and
determination of its negotiators and bargaining teams. Later, other
departmental agencies were to pick up the mantle of power, and
many of the Department of Defense's cherished aspirations were
moderated as new power combinations gained the upper hand in
the various stages of the negotiations. The Department of State,
which technically had a primary responsibility for establishing
leadership for United States national policy, in fact, was frequently
relegated to the position of an observer directing traffic between
the various competing factions within the Departments of Defense,
Commerce, Interior and Treasury. The result of this internal power
struggle was that the outward appearance of United States policy
for conduct of its law of the sea activities took on many faces over
the period of 15 years. It must be said that many of these
changes were not in response to changing negotiating strategies on
part of other world nations as much as they were in response to
unrelated internal pressures within the United States government
itself.
The second example of problems caused by lack of ocean policy
is in the development of offshore or deepwater ports. It has been
clear for many years that the only way real savings could be
achieved in the production and distribution of petroleum was
through reduction of shipping costs. Larger ships mean larger
economies in transport. Nevertheless, the United States got itself
into the position of not being able to enjoy these economies in the
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delivery of petroleum imports to this nation. There is still no port
in the United States capable of handling a supertanker of over
150,000 tons deadweight, and yet the world tanker fleet today consists of over 500 vessels of 200,000 tons or greater.3 9 It has been
estimated (1972) that exclusive use of supertankers by the United
States for petroleum imports can save between $430-$525 million
per year by 1980.40 The development of suitable deepwater port
facilities to handle these giant carriers involves a planning and construction process that requires perhaps up to a decade before such
a facility comes on line. But since there was no central planning
organization concerned with the comprehensive development of our
maritime policies, there was no one with sufficient authority to be
seriously concerned about the question of deepwater ports and their
overall relationship to our energy intensive economy.
The advent of increased concerns about the environmental problems involved in the establishment of such ports and increasing
pressures on land use planning in the coastal zones throughout the
United States have greatly, but properly, added to the difficulties
today of initiating and developing deepwater port complexes.
These complexities only serve to provide a stronger reinforcement
for the principal argument that a national ocean policy planning
mechanism is required to integrate all of the competing interests
in the best interests of the nation as a whole. The existing management structures are incapable of doing this with any reasonable
degree of efficiency.
The preceding examples are certainly not exclusive of other "case
studies" where policy failures have made the things either difficult
or impossible, and certainly costly in maritime development areas.
Many honest scholars undoubtedly could dispute the notion that
such deficiencies as cited above do, in fact, exist or that the reason
for poor performance is due to lack of policy. This in no way
changes the basic premise that without a coordinated policy mechanism such complex questions as law of the sea, offshore ports, development of a national merchant marine, coastal zone management,

39. Hood, Bigger, Bigger ... Bigger, in THE MI LmoN ToN CAmm (Proceedings of the Super Ocean Carrier Conference (SOCCO), San Pedro, Cal.
1974), at 6.
40. Lougee, Superport Development from the FederalPerspective, in THE
MILION TON CARREm, supra note 39, at 688.

etc., are infinitely more difficult than they would be under a more
centralized and continuing framework.
At present, there is a major activity within the Congress (Senate)
that may have a decided impact on the question of national ocean
policy. In December, 1973, Senators Magnuson and Hollings unveiled their proposed Senate resolution for a national ocean policy
study (NOPS) to be conducted by the Senate. On February 19,
1974, Senate Resolution 222 was passed having been sponsored by
52 senators. It authorized the Senate Commerce Committee to
undertake a "National Ocean Policy Study" through an analysis of
existing ocean policy processes and the ocean programs of the federal government. The stated purposes of this study were
(1) determining current and prospective national capabilities in
the oceans, including marine sciences and their application, oceanic
research, advancement of oceanic enterprise and marine technology
interdisciplinary education, policy planning, professional career and
employment needs, and overall requirements of the United States
consistent with the attainment of long-range national goals;
(2) determining the adequacy of current Federal programs relating to the oceans and recommending improvements in agency
structure and effectiveness to meet national needs and achieve
oceans capabilities, and assessing existing policies and laws affecting the oceans for the purpose of determining what changes might
be necessary to assure a strong and internationally competitive
oceans policy and program for the United States;
(3) establishing policies to achieve the goal of full utilization
and conservation of living resources of the oceans and recommending solutions to problems in marine fisheries and their management, rehabilitation of United States fisheries, current and future
international negotiations on fisheries, as well as aquaculture and
the extraction of drugs from the sea;
(4) assessing the needs for new policies for the development and
utilization of the nonliving resources of the oceans, including the
mineral resources of the Outer Continental Shelf and the deep seabed so that the national mineral needs can be met in an economically and environmentally sound manner;
(5) encouraging implementation of coastal zone management
through the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 by assessing
regional and interstate problems, State functions and powers in
coastal zone management, information sources, recreation needs,
pollution problems, population trends, and future pressures in the
coastal zone;
(6) establishing comprehensive national policy for the purpose
of understanding and protecting the global ocean environment
through education, exploration, research, and international cooperation; and
(7) making an assessment of proposals for, and current negotiations with respect to, achieving adequate national and international
jurisdiction over the oceans, developing an understanding of the relationship of the oceans to world order, and examining United
States policy with respect thereto.
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The strategy of the overall study has been to develop concentrated studies of the component issues related to national ocean policy. To date, approximately 12 studies have been completed under
the NOPS framework. While there has been some criticism of the
modest staffing and funding support of this effort, it has been successful in utilizing the more extensive research resources of the Library of Congress, the General Accounting Office and the congressional Office of Technology Assessment. Another criticism lies
with the fact that the study is a Senate effort rather than a joint
effort of both houses. Ultimately, we will know if this criticism
is valid when legislation generated as a result of the study is passed
from the Senate to the House for action. Despite the criticisms,
this is the only ongoing effort in the government which is looking
at the question with the necessary depth and detail required to
bring forth a balanced program for the future. Since the United
States has gone nearly 200 years without a national ocean policy,
a few more months for this study to demonstrate significant
progress seems like a reasonable amount of time.
It was not the intention of this essay to provide fixed solutions
to the generally recognized problems of the development of national
ocean policy. It was the intention to stimulate thought and perhaps
initiate dialogue which can help the policy planners of the United
States to acquire a broader and more comprehensive view of their
responsibilities. The 71 percent of our planet that is covered by
water must become the object of serious study and consideration
in the future policy planning processes of the United States; if the
present trends continue we will be indeed a second-rate sea power.
This is not affordable in today's world.

